Infants imitate behaviour flexibly. Depending on the circumstances, they copy both actions and their effects or only reproduce the demonstrator's intended goals. In view of this selective imitation, infants have been called rational imitators. The ability to selectively and adaptively imitate behaviour would be a beneficial capacity for robots. Indeed, selecting what to imitate is an outstanding unsolved problem in the field of robotic imitation. In this paper, we first present a formalized model of rational imitation suited for robotic applications. Next, we test and demonstrate it using two humanoid robots.
Introduction
Imitation is a very important form of social learning in human beings and has been suggested to underlie human cumulative culture (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Tomasello, 2009 ). In keeping with its importance in human development, the ability to imitate emerges early in human infants. From their second year on, infants can imitate actions and their intended goals from demonstrators (e.g. Garie´py et al., 2014; Jones, 2009) . Critically, infants imitate the demonstrated actions and their effects in a flexible way. Depending on the circumstances, they copy both actions and effects or only reproduce intended goals. In view of this selective imitation, infants have been called rational imitators (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002) .
In a landmark paper, Meltzoff (1988) showed that 14-month-old children switch on a light by bending over and touching it with their head, if they have seen an experimenter do so. Later studies showed that if the experimenter's hands are occupied children tend to switch on the light using their hands (Gergely et al., 2002) . The percentage of copied head touch actions also declines when the demonstrator's hands are physically restrained (Gelle´n & Buttelmann, 2017; Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009) . Apparently, when the experimenter's hands are occupied or restrained, the children deem the head touch to be irrelevant to the outcome. These results have been replicated by Beisert et al. (2012) and Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, and Bekkering (2011), albeit with a different interpretation.
Another aspect of rational imitation was demonstrated in a study by Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005) . A demonstrator moved a toy mouse to a target position using either a sliding or hopping motion. If a toy house was present at the goal location, children were less likely to copy the motion than if no house was present. The authors assumed that the presence of the house induced the children to adopt the goal of placing the mouse in the house whilst disregarding the demonstrated motion. In the absence of the toy house, the children presumably perceived motions as being the goal and, therefore, as relevant.
In summary, young children (act as if they) are able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant aspects of demonstrated behaviour. They seem to copy the actions more often if relevant for attaining the goal. In particular, they seem to (1) take into account the constraints of the demonstrator and (2) discount actions in favour of goals.
Since the advent of robotics, imitation has been suggested as a method for learning in robots. Billard, Calinon, Dillmann, and Schaal (2008) list two advantages of imitation learning. First, learning from a demonstrator greatly simplifies the search solutions to sensorimotor problems, which are typically hard. In addition, imitating robots would be programmable by laypersons using the same methods they employ to teach other people.
Robotic imitation faces a number of challenges (Dautenhahn & Nehaniv, 2002) . One of the most fundamental issues is determining what to imitate (Breazeal & Scassellati, 2002; Carpenter & Call, 2006) . Among other aspects, this involves determining the relevant parts of a demonstrated action and only copying those. Hence, the selective and rational imitation shown by children would be a beneficial capacity for robots (Gergely, 2003) . Unfortunately, in spite of the considerable body of experimental data, the cognitive mechanisms underlying rational imitation remain elusive. In particular, no satisfactory and computationally explicit model of rational imitation in infants is available.
Initially, authors explained the results of experiments by assuming that infants reason teleologically about the goals and actions demonstrated (see Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014, for references) . Children are assumed to infer that (1) the demonstrator uses his or her head to switch on the lamp because his or her hands are constrained and (2), as such, the head touch is not necessary to switch on the lamp successfully. Therefore, when asked to switch on the lamp, the infant uses his or her hands. In contrast, when the demonstrator's hands are free, the infants are assumed to reason that the head touch is instrumental in obtaining the goal.
More recently, competing accounts have been advanced (see also Gelle´n & Buttelmann, 2017 , for an overview). In particular, it has been proposed that many experimental results can be explained by differences in the difficulty of the infants copying the demonstrator's actions (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014) . According to this account, bending forward to touch a lamp with restrained hands is more difficult than doing so with free hands available to support the body. As such, an increased difficulty in exactly copying the demonstrated motion -termed a lack of 'motor resonance' (Paulus et al., 2011) -is assumed to reduce the extent to which infants copy a demonstrated action. Beisert et al. (2012) advanced yet another account of rational imitation in infants. These authors have claimed that attentional processes can fully explain selective imitation.
While it is undoubtedly (and unsurprisingly) true that both the feasibility of the demonstrated actions and attentional processes determine the fidelity of action copying, neither of these alternative accounts fully accomodate the experimental findings (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014) . For example, even in the absence of obvious differences in action difficulty, 12-month-old infants copy a model with constrained hands less often (Zmyj et al., 2009 ). In addition, 12-month-old -but not 9-month-old -infants ignored the head touch action of a model with hands fixed to the table (Zmyj et al., 2009 ). It is difficult to see how infants would be susceptible to 'a lack of motor resonance' at 12 months but not at 9 months. Likewise, attentional mechanisms cannot explain effects across conditions that do not seem to recruit different levels of attention (Kolling, Ó turai, & Knopf, 2014; Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013) .
While the motor resonance and attention theories fall short in accommodating some data, the reasoning hypothesis suffers mainly from being underspecifiedalthough it can be noted that the idea of 'motor resonance' is also less than fully specified (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014) . As a result, the reasoning account can be made to accommodate most findings post facto. For example, Paulus et al. (2011) conducted an experiment to distinguish between the reasoning account and the motor resonance model. They concluded that findings were more in line with the predictions of the motor resonance model. However, it is unclear whether the predictions these authors derive for the teleological reasoning account are the only interpretation possible (see Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014 , for a similar remark).
In the absence of a complete and computationally explicit model, we propose a novel model for rational imitation, the cost difference model (CDM). In particular, we aim for a model that supports rational imitation in robots. By contrast with the accounts discussed above -and in accord with our goal to exploit rational imitation to optimize the imitation behaviour in robots -we depart from a normative analysis of imitation learning. That is, we postulate the desirable properties of rational imitation and build a model satisfying these requirements.
2 The cost difference model
Rationale
In agreement with current views on its adaptive value (e.g. Erbas, Winfield, & Bull, 2013; Laland, 2004) , we propose that imitation is a method for acquiring better action policies (Argall, Chernova, Veloso, & Browning, 2009) . Action policies can be thought of as a series of subgoals that lead towards attaining the final goal. For example, an action policy for making spaghetti (final goal) are the steps (subgoals) as set out in the recipe.
Assuming that imitation is a learning strategy for adopting better action policies for satisfying goals, imitation has the possible advantage of being a cheaper (less risky) route to policy learning than individual, asocial learning. Nevertheless, indiscriminately copying behaviour is unlikely to result in better policies (Laland, 2004) . Ideally, agents should only copy behaviour when an observed policy is better than the current existing action policy. Initially, we can assume better policies to be those requiring less energy. However, other optimization criteria could be imagined, including risk and time. In biological agents, better action policies are those ultimately resulting in increased fitness.
In this light, experimental findings on imitation in infants are somewhat puzzling. Infants copy demonstrated head touches in spite of clearly being able to switch on the light using their hands (which seems to be a better policy). Indeed, in control conditions, children spontaneously switch on the light using their hands. Moreover, even when infants eventually copy the head touch, they most often switch on the light using their hands first (Gergely, 2003; Paulus et al., 2013 Paulus et al., , 2011 . So why do children copy the ineffective head touch policy, given they have an alternative policy that seems more efficient?
In our view, this discrepancy can be explained by assuming that an agent observing a demonstrated action policy has only limited knowledge about its energetic cost. The agent might be able to estimate the energy requirement of the demonstrated policy, for example, using its own action planner (or internal simulation; Hesslow (2002 Hesslow ( , 2012 ). However, this will yield an approximate estimate at best -especially when the demonstrated policy includes unfamiliar actions. In addition, the agent can estimate or retrieve the cost of its existing action policy and compare this with the estimated value of the demonstrated action policy. In agreement with the assumption that infants assess the cost of observed actions, infants seem to expect demonstrators to minimize the costs of actions (Liu & Spelke, 2017, and references therein) . Actions that violate this assumption recruit more attention from infants.
Theoretically, the agent should reject the demonstrated policy whenever its cost is higher than that of the existing policy. However, the cost of the demonstrated policy is not directly accessible and is only an estimate. As such, seeing someone executing a costly action policy might indicate that the estimated cost is inaccurate. If so, it would be reasonable to actually execute the demonstrated policy and obtain a corrected estimate of its cost. Indeed, the potential long-term gain of chancing on an innovative policy would generally outweigh the cost of testing out the action.
In summary, we propose that the rational imitation observed in infants is the overt outcome of the underlying uncertainty about the cost of the demonstrated action policy. That is, when copying an action policy they are exploring its cost by physically executing it. This overt action will result in a better estimate of its real cost. Our hypothesis predicts that explorative copying of actions should occur more often if the demonstrator is deemed trustworthy (Laland, 2004; Vanderelst, Ahn, & Barakova, 2009 ). This is corroborated in experiments. Infants more often copy ineffective behaviour from trusted (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Polonia, 2011; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010) or familiar (Beisert et al., 2012) demonstrators. In addition, the notion of imitation as a method for exploring an action's cost is supported by the finding (mentioned previously) that, even when infants eventually copy head touches, they most often switch on the light using their hands first. Hence, when copying the head touches, they actually perform both actions most of the time (Gergely, 2003; Paulus et al., 2013 Paulus et al., , 2011 . This would allow them to compare the cost of both action policies directly. Moreover, our account predicts that children should have a tendency to overimitate irrelevant actions, as they result in an unexpected high cost estimate, triggering explorative imitation of the demonstrated actions. This has been confirmed in a series of experiments (Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007) . Finally, in agreement with our thesis, infants seem to assume that demonstrators will minimize the costs of their actions. When demonstrators fail to do so, this recruits increased levels of attention (Liu & Spelke, 2017) ; this heightened recruitment of attention could be the mechanism that leads to increased imitation (or overimitation).
It should be pointed out that our functional description of rational imitation suggests that similar adaptive advantages are to be gained by other species. As such, it is interesting that both chimpanzees (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007) and dogs (Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007) have found to be selective imitators in much the same way as human infants.
Having outlined a functional account of rational imitation, we proceed to describe the computations we assume to underlie the selection of action policies for imitation. We propose that this proceeds in three steps: (1) parsing the continuous stream of sensory input; (2) solving the correspondence problem; (3) comparing the costs of the existing and the demonstrated action policies.
Formalization
2.2.1 Parsing behaviour. Behaviour consists of dynamic and continuous motions, and their effects. Hence, the first challenge for an imitating agent is that of parsing this stream of sensory input into meaningful chunks of actions and resulting effects. Indeed, young infants have been shown to parse behaviour into goal-oriented chunks (e.g. Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001) . In principle, infants might use a wealth of task-related knowledge to solve this problem. However, they could also exploit low-level sensory cues signalling the boundaries between behavioural units, especially in early developmental stages (Baldwin et al., 2001) . Indeed, adults will often explicitly capture the child's attention before initiating a demonstration. Likewise, they use verbal cues to signal that the action has been completed. Verbal cues are commonly used in experimental investigations of imitation to denote the start and end of a demonstration (e.g. Paulus et al., 2011; Schwier, Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006; Zmyj et al., 2009 ). In addition, more basic sensory cues could be salient changes in visual and auditory input or object motion.
In our experiments, we assume that the robot can use either task-related knowledge or low-level sensory cues to parse the behaviour of a demonstrator and do not model this step explicitly.
2.2.2
Solving the correspondence problem. The second computational step concerns solving the correspondence problem. needs to be converted into module the observed behaviour into coordinate system of the observer. The correspondence problem is far from trivial (Nehaniv & Dautenhahn, 2001) , in particular when the body plan of the demonstrator and observer are different. Indeed, errors made in solving the correspondence problem are assumed to be an important bottleneck, preventing successful infant imitation (Gattis, Bekkering, & WohlSchlager, 2002) . However, in the field of robotics, a substantial amount of research has resulted in a number of methods for solving this problem (e.g. Argall et al., 2009; Nehaniv, 2007; Schaal, Ijspeert, & Billard, 2003) . Hence, in this paper, we assume that the problem can be solved using the methods proposed earlier. The output of this computational step, a sequence of states in the observer's coordinate system, will be denoted asõ t with t indexing the time, where t = [0, T].
2.2.3
Inferring the demonstrator's policy. To model imitation based on the assumptions outlined above, we need to propose a mechanism that allows agents to infer the demonstrated action policy from the observed sequence of statesõ t . That is, the imitator needs to infer fromõ t which intermediate goals the demonstrator satisfies en route to the final goal. To the best of our knowledge, no account of the method used by infants to select relevant subgoals from observed actions is available.
Hence, in what follows, we present an approach that is suitable for the current robotic experiments. It should be understood that this method is a first approach and could be refined in further work to suit other contexts.
In more formal terms, inferring the demonstrator's action policy can be thought of as selecting the minimal number of intermediate states fromõ t required to explain the observed behaviourõ t . These minimal required states, denotedõ s , are assumed to be the subgoals of the demonstrator. Next, we explain our current approach to selecting this minimal set of statesõ s .
We suggest that the robot should select an iteratively expanding set of statesõ s = fo 0 ; . . . ; o n ; . . . ; o T g from the observed statesõ t . For each setõ s , the robot uses its own action planner to compute an action sequencẽ a t leading from o 0 to o T through the intermittent states o n inõ s . In planning the action sequenceã t , the robot should take into account the physical constraints C experienced by the demonstrator. Hence, the action sequenceã t is the action plan that the robot would come up with itself (1) if it were in the same situation as the demonstrator and (2) wanted to attain each of the selected subgoals inõ s . As such, the notation for the planned action sequence,ã t , should be considered as shorthand forã t = f ðõ s ; CÞ indicating that the planned action sequence is a function of (1) the currently selected action statesõ s and (2) the physical constraints C. In terms of the behavioural experiments discussed above, physical constraints could include the fact that the demonstrator's hands are occupied (e.g. as in Gergely et al., 2002) .
For each set of selected statesõ s and its resulting action sequenceã t , the imitator estimates the cost ofã t . We tentatively suggest that the cost is expressed in terms of energy expenditure. The estimated energetic costÊðã t Þ is compared with the estimated cost of the demonstrated action sequenceÊðõ t Þ, calculating the cost difference DE as
In equation (1), the parameter S(o t ) indicates the saliency of the demonstrated stateõ t . This weighting allows part of the demonstrated action sequenceõ t to be discounted in favour of salient action outcomes. The saliency of (part of) a demonstration could be computed using existing approaches to visual saliency methods developed in the field of human-machine interaction (e.g. He, Ge, & Zhang, 2014; Scassellati, 2002) . In the experiments reported in this paper, we do not vary this parameter and fix it at a value of 1. However, experimental evidence strongly suggests that saliency is an important factor (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2005; Liu & Spelke, 2017) and we plan to expand the model in this direction.
At first, the set of selected statesõ s only contains the initial and final observed states, i.e.,õ s = fo 0 ; o T g. However, the set is iteratively expanded by adding more intermediate states. Therefore, the set of selected statesõ s will eventually approach the observed action sequenceõ t . In consequence, DE approaches zero as the setõ s is expanded. When the value of DE is below a certain threshold t E , expansion ofõ s is terminated and the current setõ s (with the exception of the initial state o 0 ) is taken to contain the subgoals in the observed behaviour. The setõ s contains the minimum number of subgoals that are required to explain the (cost of the) observed behaviourõ t . Also, notice that the iterative process implies that when DEðõ s = fo 0 ; o T gÞ\t E , the imitator will simply plan an action sequence to attain the final state demonstrated -hence, no imitation of any intermediate goal will take place. In this case, the imitator assumes that the observed behaviourõ t can be adequately explained by assuming that the demonstrator is simply attempting to reach the final goal. No subgoals need to be assumed.
Obviously, the setõ s can be expanded in many ways. Here, we propose that, on each iteration, additional states are selected at time instances between the currently selected states. At first, only two states will be selectedõ
On the next iteration, an additional state in between these two will be added:õ s = fo 0 ; oT 2 ; o T g. Next, the set will be expanded toõ s = fo 0 ; oT 4 ; oT 2 ; o3T 4 ; o T g. In other words, at the nth iteration, the length ofõ s is given by jõ s j = 1 + 2 nÀ1 .
In equation (1),ã t denotes the action sequence planned to attain the selected statesõ t . Hence, we assume that the agent can plan an action sequence passing through a number of selected goal states. In addition, we assume that the agent can plan this taking into account the physical constraints C of the demonstrator. This assumption represents the most challenging cognitive ability supposed under our model. However, evidence suggests that infants are capable of planning actions under physical constraints (Claxton, Keen, & McCarty, 2003; Upshaw & Sommerville, 2015) . Figure 1 illustrates this process. Figure 1(b) depicts a hypothetical path followed by a demonstrator (depicted as a black line) from start to goal. Observing this path, an imitator iteratively selects an increasing number of states (here: n = 2, 3 and 4, respectively) from the demonstrated path. Selecting only the start and goal position (Figure 1(c) ) leads to a large cost difference DE (Figure 1(f) ). The reason is that the planned actionã t does not include the first deviation present in the demonstrator's path. However, by including an additional third state (Figure 1(d) ), the imitator's planned action sequenceã t better matches the demonstrated path (and energetic cost). Adding more states does not improve the match (Figure 1(e) and (f) ). Hence, the imitator will copy the three states (depicted in Figure 1(d) ). When starting from a different initial state than the demonstrator, the imitator is assumed to ignore selected state o 0 . The imitated path is shown in Figure 1 (g).
Accounting for experimental data
In this section, we explain how the CDM accounts for the relevant findings in the literature on rational imitation in human infants. In particular, we discuss the Notice that this results in a discrepancy between pathsã t andõ t . In particular, the first curve is not included inã t . This will result in a value for DE that is larger than t E . Hence, additional states will be added toõ s . This is illustrated in panels (d) and (e), whereõ s contains three and four selected states, respectively. (d) By selecting a single additional state, the match between pathsã t andõ t increases (and DE\t E ). (e,f) At this point, the iterative expansion ofõ s is terminated; adding further states does not markedly decrease DE. (g) The path the imitator would follow (note that it starts from a different location than the demonstrator). Omitting state o 0 fromõ s , it goes to o T via o 1 , thereby imitating the unnecessary (and energetically demanding) detour shown by the demonstrator.
results of Carpenter et al. (2005) because these allow us to illustrate all aspects of the CDM. The relevant findings of these authors are depicted in Figure 2 . To recapitulate, these authors reported (among other results) that 18-month-old children were most prone to copy the actions demonstrated by an experimenter when a toy mouse was moved across a table top using a hopping motion (Figure 2(a) , condition 1). They copied the action less faithfully when the mouse was slid across the table (Figure 2(a) , condition 2) and even less so when a small toy house was present at the final location (Figure 2(a) , conditions 3 and 4). Finally, moving the mouse to the toy house using a hopping motion was somewhat more likely to be copied (Figure 2(a) , condition 4) than moving it to the house in a sliding motion (Figure 2(a), condition 3) .
First, the CDM accounts for the increased action copying associated with the hopping motion with respect to the sliding motion (conditions 1 and 3 versus 2 and 4) by assuming that the former is more energetically demanding. In other words, the hopping motion is assumed to result in a large value for the first term in equation (1) if not faithfully modelled using a sufficient number of statesõ t .
Second, the CDM can account for the reduction in copying due to the introduction of the house (conditions 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4) in terms of the saliency parameter, S(o t ). We assume that the event of inserting the toy into the house is more salient than the preceding actions. Hence, the saliency function S(o t ) discounts the preceding action. In the absence of the house, no such discounting occurs (see Figure 2(b) ).
We also briefly discuss how the CDM accommodates the experimental results using the popular head touch paradigm. The model assumes that whenever a demonstrator with free hands performs a head touch, the first term of equation (1) will be large. Indeed, the energetic demand of the head touch will be compared with that of a simple hand touch. In contrast, when the demonstrator's hands are occupied (Gergely et al., 2002) , the infant is assumed to plan an action taking into account these constraints (remember thatã t in equation (1) should be regarded as shorthand for a t = f ðõ s ; CÞ with C representing the physical constraints of the demonstrator). We assume that this will result in infants covertly planning a head touch themselves. As such, this will result in lower values for the first term of equation (1) and, therefore, a lower degree of action copying. It could be objected that is unlikely that children would come up with a head touch as (or an equally demanding alternative) a way of dealing with the constraints. However, a small percentage of infants who have not been shown the head touch still choose to touch the lamp with their heads (Paulus et al., 2013) , especially younger infants (Zmyj et al., 2009) . Hence, it is not beyond plausibility that the apparatus used in these experiments spontaneously elicits head pushing as a solution to deal with the constraint of occupied hands. Incidentally, perceiving the lamp being switched might induce discounting the preceding action through the saliency. However, this would not result in the head touch being ignored, as the end state in these experiments involves the experimenter touching the lamp with her head. Hence, even if the saliency parameter results in only the final state of the demonstration to be copied, the head touch will still be imitated.
In contrast with an account based on attentional processes (Beisert et al., 2012) , the CDM does not require conditions to recruit different levels of attention for rational imitation to occur (Kolling et al., 2014; Paulus et al., 2013) . However, attentional processes can be accounted for using the term Sðõ t Þ (equation (1)). Our model also differs in its predictions with the 'motor resonance' account of rational imitation (Paulus et al., 2011) . As mentioned, 12-month-old -but not 9-monthold -infants have been shown to ignore the head touch action of a model with hands fixed to the table (Zmyj et al., 2009) . Our model could explain these findings by assuming that 12-month-old infants are better at accounting for a model's constraints. By contrast, the motor resonance account would need to account for this by assuming that infants are more susceptible to 'a lack of motor resonance' at 12 months than at 9 months. This would imply that infants are less good at copying motor behaviour at 12 months than at 9 months. 
Methods
We used two NAO humanoid robots (Aldebaran Robotics) in this study, a blue and a red version. The blue robot was assigned the role of the demonstrator. The red robot was assigned the role of the imitator. Experiments were carried out in a 3 m by 2.5 m arena. An overhead 3D tracking system (Vicon) consisting of four cameras was used to monitor the position and orientation of the robots at a rate of 30 Hz. The robots were equipped with a clip-on helmet fitted with a number of reflective beads used by the tracking system to localize the robots. In addition to the robots, the arena contained three small tables, each with a unique pattern of reflective beads. These served as obstacles and a target position.
The custom-written Python software controlling the robots implemented a path-planning algorithm ( Figure  3 ). This algorithm overlaid the arena with a rectangular graph with nodes spaced 10 cm apart (Schult & Swart, 2008) . Nodes closer than 0.5 m to an obstacle were removed from the graph. A path between the current position of a robot and the desired goal location was planned by finding the shortest path of connected nodes between the node closest to the robot's current position and the node closest to the goal position. By removing nodes closer than 0.5 m to an obstacle, the path-planning algorithm ensured that the robots steered well clear of obstacles. In this paper, the estimated energetic costsÊðõ t Þ andÊðã t Þ are approximated by the length of the planned and observed paths, respectively. For robots moving at a constant speed, this is a fair approximation. Figure 4 illustrates the four conditions of experiment 1. In the first condition, the demonstrator is not hampered by obstacles. Hence, it moves towards the goal position using a direct path (Figure 4(a) ). In the second condition (Figure 4(b) ), the demonstrator could approach the goal using a direct path. However, the demonstrator approaches the goal by a detour. In the third condition, obstacles between the demonstrator and the goal prevent a direct path. The path-planning algorithm yields a path circumventing the obstacles (Figure 4(c) ). Finally, in the fourth condition (Figure 4(d) ), the demonstrator was sent to the goal by the same path as in condition 2. Hence, in condition 4, the detour was not planned by the path planner but explicitly programmed. Conditions 3 and 4 should lead to the same outcome. However, methodologically, condition 4 confirms that the differences between conditions 1 and 2 and between conditions 2 and 3 are not due to the way the motion of the demonstrator is planned. In other words, condition 4 demonstrates that the (internal) intention of the demonstrator is not taken into account by the imitator. The blue robot is the demonstrator. The red robot is the imitator. The green arrows depict the path taken by the demonstrator. Note that in panel (c) the demonstrator cannot pass between the two round obstacles. Details in the text.
Experiment 1: Modelling experimental findings
The critical conditions, in modelling the experimental results regarding rational imitation in infants (e.g. Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1988) , are conditions 2 and 3. In both conditions, the demonstrator does not take the direct path to the goal. The difference between these conditions, however, is the presence of an obstacle in condition 3. In this condition, the obstacle forces the demonstrator to take the longer path. This is analogous to a demonstrator switching on the lamp with her head when her hands are occupied, in the sense that the constraints of the situation necessitate the less direct (and energetically inefficient) mode of operation. Critically, the CDM assumes that the robot (infant) plans an indirect path (head touch) to cope with the constraints introduced by the obstacle (occupied hands). Hence, the robot (infant) is predicted not to imitate the indirect path (head touch). In contrast, in condition 2, given no obstacle (analogous to the free hands condition in behavioural experiments) the imitator will plan a direct path (a hand touch). The planned direct path (head touch) is assumed to differ sufficiently (in terms of energy expenditure) from the demonstrated indirect path (head touch) to incur imitation. Figure 5 depicts the results of experiment 1. In condition 1, the demonstrator takes the direct route to the goal position ( Figure 5(a) ). Calculating DE forõ t with two states results in a value lower than t E (Figures 5(e) and 6). Hence, the imitator only retains the final goal o T as policy. Therefore, the imitator proceeds directly to the goal, using a direct path ( Figure 5(i) ).
In condition 2, the demonstrator takes a detour to the goal, in spite of a direct path being possible ( Figure  5(b) ). Calculating DE forõ t with two states results in a value higher than t E (Figures 5(f) and 6) . In contrast, calculating DE forõ t with three states results in a value The planned pathã t is shown in red forõ s with two states, i.e.,õ t = fo 0 ; o T g and in blue, forõ s with three states, i.e.,õ s = fo 0 ; o T=2 ; o T g . In conditions 1, 3 and 4, the red path a t matches the demonstrated pathõ t well. That is, DE \ t E . In condition 2, the red pathã t does not match the demonstrated pathõ t (DE.t E ). In contrast, the blue pathã t satisfies the requirement DE\t E . Here, only the resulting pathsã t for jõ s j equal to 2 and 3 are shown. However, pathsã t for jõ s j equal to 5, 9 and 17 were also evaluated. Their resulting weighted cost differences D E are plotted in Figure 6 . (i)-(l) Imitated behaviour for each of the four conditions. Notice that the imitator does not start from the same position as the demonstrator. In conditions 1, 3 and 4, the imitator proceeds to the goal (i.e., o T ) by a direct path. In condition 2, the set of selected states contains three states. Hence, the imitator proceeds to o T via an intermediate state, i.e., o 0 !o T/2 !o T . lower than t E (Figures 5(f) and 6) . Hence, the policy copied will include an additional subgoal en route to the goal. The imitator proceeds to this intermediate goal before going to the final goal ( Figure 5(j) ). The blue pathã t , based onõ s with three states, in Figure  5 (e) satisfies the requirement DE\t E . Hence, the policy copied will include an additional subgoal en route to the goal. The imitator proceeds to this intermediate goal before going to the final goal ( Figure 5(j) ).
In condition 3 and 4, the demonstrator reaches the goal via a detour ( Figure 5(c) and (d) ). However, the presence of an obstacle in these conditions makes this necessary. Therefore, the pathã t planned by the imitator from o 0 to o T (i.e. jõ s j ¼ 2) will also contain this detour. Indeed, the red pathã t for jõ s j ¼ 2 ( Figure 5 (g) and (h)) matches the demonstrated pathõ t sufficiently (DE\t E , Figure 6 ). As a result, the imitator proceeds directly to the final goal ( Figure 5(k) and (l)), as it did in condition 1.
Experiment 1 was aimed at modelling the basic findings of the behavioural experiments regarding rational imitation in infants (Beisert et al., 2012; Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1988; Paulus et al., 2011; Zmyj et al., 2009) . As mentioned, these authors showed that children copied the head touch demonstrated by adults only if the adult's hands were unrestricted. In our robot experiments, the imitator only copied the demonstrated detour if the demonstrator was not forced to take this detour by the obstacles (Condition 2, Figure 5(b) , (f) and (j)). In contrast, when the demonstrator took the same path -but was forced to do so on account of an obstacle -the imitator disregarded the detour (Conditions 3 and 4). As such, conditions 2 and 3 reveal our robots modelling the behaviour of infants in the behavioural experiments discussed.
Experiment 2: learning better policies
In our view, the cited behavioural experiments concerning rational imitation can be considered cases of pathological imitation (Winfield & Erbas, 2011) . That is, the behavioural experiments are set up to induce imitation in spite of the behaviour being inefficient, i.e., the head touch is a less efficient way of switching on the light than a hand touch. The experiments of Lyons et al. (2007) and Keupp et al. (2013) illustrate how easily children can be tricked into imitating inefficient behaviour. In these experiments, the demonstrating adult exhibited a range of action irrelevant to attain a given goal. Nevertheless, the infants tended to copy these actions -even when explicitly instructed not to copy any 'silly' behaviour. However, when not experimentally controlled, adults' behaviour can generally be assumed to be more efficient or more adaptive than that of infants. Under these conditions, as will be shown next, the mechanism proposed for selecting policies for imitation is adaptive.
In this section of the paper, we present a robotic experiment showing that the CDM can also select more efficient policies if these are observed in a demonstrator. Indeed, by virtue of equation (1), the CDM can select policies for explorative imitation that are less costly than the current policy. The current policy of the robot amounts to the planned routeã t forõ s with only two states (o 0 and o T ). For jõ s j = 2, the robot will generate a plan reaching the end goal without taking into account the demonstrated behaviour. If the observed policyõ t is significantly less costly than the currently held policy, DE will be larger than t E (by virtue of the absolute value operator in equation (1). This will trigger the expansion of the set of intermediate goalsõ s until DE is smaller than t E .
In experiment 2, the imitator starts with a policy that is clearly not optimal. When going from the start position to the goal, the imitator takes an unnecessary detour (Figure 7(a) ). This detour is caused by the imitator's path-planning algorithm not considering the locations in the hatched area (Figure 7(a) ). In effect, the hatched area is not part of the search space considered by the path-planning algorithm. In contrast, Figure  7 (b) shows the demonstrator moving in a straight line from start to goal -as depicted in this panel, the whole arena is part of the demonstrator's search space. Exploiting this example, the demonstrator can find a shorter path to the goal. Considering the observed behaviourõ t , the imitator iteratively expands a set of selected statesõ s from the demonstrated statesõ t . Each state o s inõ s corresponds to a position of the demonstrator in the arena. By adding states o s toõ s , the imitator effectively expands its path-planning search space. Iteratively expanding the set of selected statesõ s will eventually lead to filling in the part of the search space that was initially not available to the imitator (in Figure 7(a) ). Indeed, in effect, a corridor between the start and goal positions is built (Figure 7(c) ). When this corridor is established, the value DE\t E (at jõ s j = 5, Figure 7(d) ) and expansion ofõ s is stopped. Eventually, the imitator imitates the shorter path, as shown in Figure 7 (c).
Discussion
Selective and rational imitation shown by children would be a beneficial capacity for robots (Gergely, 2003) . Unfortunately, no computationally explicit model of rational imitation in infants is available. In this paper, we have presented a formalization that captures the most relevant aspects of the behaviour of infants in experiments. The CDM can be considered a formalized version of the teleological reasoning hypothesis, which is underspecified (see Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014, for references) . As such, the CDM is explicit enough to be implemented on robots, as demonstrated.
While our model is primarily conceived as a practical method for supporting rational imitation in robots, it can also be evaluated for its ability to explain infant behaviour. Considering the CDM as a psychological model of rational imitation in infants allows a number of predictions to be made. First, the CDM predicts that the surface structure of the observed action is not important in determining whether the action will be imitated by infants. Observed actions that have similar associated predicted costs,Êðõ t Þ, will induce similar levels of imitation. Experimental work, using paradigms akin to those used to evaluate overimitation (Keupp et al., 2013; Lyons et al., 2007) , could test this prediction. These experiments use arbitrary complex action sequences and evaluate the extent to which they are copied by the child. According to the CDM, changing the order of the actions in a sequence should (while keeping the total cost constant) not influence the level of imitation. A second prediction that follows from our model is that the sign of the cost difference, Eðõ t Þ ÀÊðã t Þ, does not influence the level of imitation. Indeed, we postulate that only the absolute value of the difference is taken into account in calculating DE. Therefore, the CDM predicts that actions that are both more costly and more efficient than the current strategy known to infants should lead to similar levels of imitation. Again, this is a testable prediction of the CDM. A third prediction of the CDM is that the two previous predictions can be modulated by targeted manipulations of the saliency of parts of the action sequences used.
Funding
This work was supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (grant number EP/L024861/1 ('Verifiable Autonomy')). 
